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Since independence there is widespread grievance
among Kenyan Muslims who feel that the mainly
Christian regime treats them as second-class citizens
and discriminates against them economically and po-
litically. The government, for its part, has fears that
the influence of some foreign and local radical Mus-
lims could disrupt peace and security in Kenya. The
1992–1994 Muslim disturbances along the coast, the
twin bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi and
Dar-es-Salaam in 1998, and the recent bombing of a
tourist hotel in Mombasa for which al-Q aci d a h a s
claimed responsibility intensify these fears. Never-
theless the vast majority of Kenyan Muslims are mod-
erate, reject violent extremism, and work to achieve
equal rights by peaceful means.
Islam and Politics
in Kenya
Kenya's six million Muslims form a signifi-
cant minority, representing 20 per cent of
the population. Their large number, com-
bined with the fact that most of them are
concentrated in economically and strategi-
cally important areas, gives the Muslims, at
least potentially, considerable political
weight. On the coastal strip and in the
towns there, such as Mombasa, Malindi, and
Lamu, Muslims account for more than 50
per cent of the population. On this strip live
the Swahilis (all of whom are Muslims),
Arabs, and people from various African eth-
nic groups that have adopted Islam. Anoth-
er important group of Muslims in Kenya are
the Somalis, who live in the Northeastern
Province. Their number is estimated at
about 600,000. There are also considerable
numbers of Muslims in the large towns, in-
cluding Nairobi. Among Kenya's Muslims
there are various groups and denomina-
tions. Due to the fact that Islamic penetra-
tion into the area came primarily from
Hadramaut, to the south of the Arabian
Peninsula, and was spread by Sunni S h a f ici
shaikhs, the great majority of Kenya's Mus-
lims are Sunni of the S h a f ici s c h o o l .
The Kenyan government, like the govern-
ments of Uganda, Tanzania, and most
African countries, prohibits the formation of
political parties based on religion. There-
fore, religious leaders – Muslim and Christ-
ian alike – set up 'religious' or 'social' organi-
zations through which they can express
their views. Since independence, many such
Muslim organizations have come and gone.
Some of them were regional or sectional,
others nationwide. They are supposed to
deal with educational, religious, and social
matters. Nevertheless, these organizations
have frequently become involved in politi-
cal concerns. The authorities in Kenya, like
those in Uganda and Tanzania, have them-
selves established Muslim umbrella organi-
zations and worked through them to obtain
Muslim support and to influence and super-
vise their activities. Many of the key posi-
tions in these organizations are occupied by
Muslims who support the government,
among them assistant ministers and senior
government or ruling-party officials. The
main Muslim umbrella organization is the
Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUP-
K E M ) .
Since independence, the authorities have
seen to it that Muslims are represented in
the government – in the ruling party and in
public institutions. Muslims have generally
been represented in government by two or
three assistant ministers who are loyal to
the regime, out of a total of forty to fifty
ministers and assistant ministers. The Mus-
lim assistant ministers generally come from
a very small circle. When President Moi
came to power in 1978, Muslims were gen-
erally better represented and, for the first
time, two Muslim ministers were appointed.
Furthermore, in 1982, a Somali Muslim Chief
of Staff was appointed. After the 1997 elec-
tions, there were 30 Muslim MPs out of 210
MPs (14.2 per cent).
There have been other concessions that
the government has made since indepen-
dence to gain Muslim support, especially in
periods of municipal, parliamentary, and
presidential elections, when the political
importance of the Muslims is especially no-
ticeable. Among these concessions were:
making the Muslim festival of Id al-Fitr a na-
tional public holiday in Kenya; enshrining
the position of chief q a d i in the constitution
(the chief q a d i is the highest Muslim reli-
gious official in Kenya and he serves as the
government's adviser in all matters pertain-
ing to Muslims); deciding on issues connect-
ed to inheritance, marriage, divorce, and
w a q f (endowment set aside for religious
purposes) in the s h a r ica courts by q a d is ap-
pointed by the chief q a d i; and taking into
account Muslim values and practices in
areas such as animal slaughter, autopsies,
dress, and identity cards.
Mutual suspicions
Muslim aspirations were not, however,
fully satisfied, nor were their many com-
plaints about discrimination silenced. Mus-
lim discontent was particularly evident on
the eve of the first multiparty elections in
1992. At the same time, government suspi-
cions of Muslim aspirations, rooted in both
historical and recent events, also intensified.
The government's suspicions were first
aroused by political developments on the
eve of Kenyan independence when Muslims
on the coast set up an organization called the
Mwambao United Front (MUF) (Mwambao
means 'coast' in Kiswahili). The MUF claimed
that the Muslim inhabitants of the coast were
a 'distinct social group' and should be grant-
ed autonomy or the option of seceding from
Kenya to establish a separate state or 'rejoin'
Zanzibar. In 1963, when Kenya became inde-
pendent, the coastal population's hopes for
separation or autonomy vanished, although
they have re-emerged from time to time in
different forms and have aroused displeasure
and fear in the government. Likewise, the So-
mali Muslims in the Northeastern Province
desired to join Somalia with which they had
ethnic, linguistic, social, and religious affini-
ties. After the British decided to include this
area in independent Kenya, the Somalis boy-
cotted the 1963 general elections that set the
stage for independence. Thereafter, for sev-
eral years there was unrest, and violent clash-
es occurred between Somali guerrillas,
known as Shifta, and the Kenyan security
f o r c e s .
Since then, the authorities in general
closely monitor Muslim political activities
and take harsh measures when these activi-
ties seem to threaten the government. The
Islamic activities of foreigners in Kenya are
watched especially closely. Nevertheless,
until the emergence of the Islamic Party of
Kenya (IPK), the mutual suspicion between
the government and the coastal Muslims
seldom led to violent confrontations.
The Islamic Party of Kenya
In January 1992, immediately after the
government acceptance of a multiparty sys-
tem for the forthcoming presidential and
parliamentary elections, several Muslim ac-
tivists in Mombasa established the IPK. Until
that time, Kenya had had a one-party sys-
tem. The government refused to recognize
the IPK on the grounds that it was a reli-
gious political party and thus violated the
principle of the separation of church and
state. At this stage, the IPK's demand for
recognition won wide support from Mus-
lims, both from the coastal strip and from
other parts of the country. In Mombasa, es-
pecially, IPK supporters became the main
political force and the government's refusal
to recognize the party caused violent distur-
bances there in May 1992. This was the first
of a series of clashes between IPK activists
and government forces that continued spo-
radically for nearly two years.
The outbreak of violence reflected Muslim
grievances and deep feelings of discrimina-
tion. During the colonial era and since inde-
pendence, Muslims have repeatedly com-
plained that the mainly Christian regime
discriminates against them and treats them
as second-class citizens. For example, they
are normally under-represented in public
institutions. Before colonialism they were
the most culturally advanced group and
were the rulers of Kenya's coastal region,
whereas today Muslims are less advanced
than the Christians and lag behind in educa-
tion. They have been denied land owner-
ship, while Christians from the interior have
been given land on the coastal strip and
control the main sources of income there,
especially tourism. 
Against this background of Muslim dissat-
isfaction, a young shaikh, Khalid Balala, ap-
peared on the scene and became the main
exponent of Islamic extremism in Kenya dur-
ing the violent disturbances of 1992–1994.
Balala demanded the legalization of the IPK,
stressing that in Islam there is no separation
of religion and state and that politics is part
of religion. Initially he enjoyed wide Muslim
support and became the uncrowned head
and spokesman of the IPK, which became
much more radical under his leadership. His
supporters, especially the youth, and some
extremist elements began to clash with the
security forces. Balala publicly demanded
that President Moi's regime be overthrown,
and accused him of despotism and corrup-
tion. He also called on Muslims to be strict in
observing Islamic practices, especially daily
prayers. He demanded that the s h a r ica l a w
be applied in all spheres of Muslim life. Bal-
ala advocated violence to achieve these
aims. 
The wave of violence in Mombasa sur-
prised and concerned the authorities and
reawakened the deep suspicions dating
from the attempts by the Muslim coastal
strip to break away from Kenya at indepen-
dence. There was also apprehension lest the
unrest spread from Mombasa to other Mus-
lim centres, as indeed happened in Lamu
and Malindi. Eventually the government
succeeded in crushing Balala and the mili-
tant Muslims, using the carrot-and-stick and
divide-and-rule tactics. Extremists were ar-
rested and brutal force was used against
them. On the other hand, the regime began
to look more favourably on the demands of
moderate Muslims. In addition, the United
Muslims of Africa (UMA) was established by
government supporters as an opposition to
the IPK.
The 1998 bombing of the US embassies in
Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam by foreign Mus-
lim extremists assisted, it is suspected, by
some locals highlighted again the problem-
atic relationship between the Muslims and
the regime. The government shut down
several Muslim NGOs and deported some
non-indigenous workers who were suspect-
ed of links with radical Middle Eastern orga-
nizations, on the grounds that they posed a
threat to security. The Muslim community
was enraged by the crackdown on the NGOs
and leaders of all persuasions condemned
the government action. They claimed that,
by shutting down only Muslim NGOs imme-
diately after the bombing, the government
had put the onus of responsibility on the
Muslim community. President Moi met with
SUPKEM leaders and made some conciliato-
ry gestures to the Muslims, but radical Mus-
lims continued to criticize the government
and attacked the West in general and the US
in particular. This division between moder-
ates and radical, as well as ethnic, religious,
political, and personal rivalries within the
Muslim community, weaken them in their
confrontation with the regime.
It is likely that Islam as a religion will fur-
ther expand and gain strength in Kenya. In
its non-extremist form, it may well assume a
greater political role in the light of the polit-
ical progress Muslims are making in the field
of education and the increasing numbers of
Muslim intellectuals, journalists, and politi-
cians. The prolonged struggle against gov-
ernment policies has fostered Muslim soli-
darity and self-consciousness, even among
non-observant Muslims. The majority of
Muslims are moderate, tolerant, and prag-
matic and know that the government will
never tolerate secession. The Kenyan gov-
ernment, for its part, needs to be more un-
derstanding and responsive to justified
Muslim grievances, to provide Muslims with
equal opportunities, and make greater ef-
forts to integrate them into government
and public life. 
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